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Abstract
Worldwide, the number of patients able to benefit from kidney transplantation is greatly
restricted by the severe shortage of deceased donor organs. Allocation of this scarce resource
is increasingly challenging and complex. Striking an acceptable balance between efficient use
(utility) and fair access (equity) to the limited supply of donated kidneys, raises controversial
but important debates at ethical, medical and social levels.
There is no international consensus on the recipient and donor factors that should be
considered in the kidney allocation process. There is a general trend towards a reduction in
the influence of human leukocyte antigen mismatch and a rise in the importance of other
factors shown to affect post-transplant outcome, such as cold ischaemia, duration of dialysis,
donor and recipient age and comorbidity. Increased consideration of equity has led to
improved access to transplantation for disadvantaged patient groups. There has been a
welcomed overall improvement in the transparency and accountability of allocation policies.
Novel and contentious approaches in kidney allocation include the use of survival prediction
scores, as a criterion for access to the waiting list, as well as at the point of organ offering
with matching of predicted graft and recipient survival.
This review compares the diverse international approaches to deceased donor kidney
allocation and their evolution over the last decade.
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Introduction
The superior outcomes of kidney transplantation over dialysis, and the growing incidence of
end-stage renal disease (ESRD), have led to an exponential rise in the need for kidney
transplantation worldwide.1 In contrast, the number of deceased donors has changed little and
is vastly insufficient.2 Consequently, patients face longer waiting times, as well as a higher
risk of morbidity and mortality while on the waiting list. In the US alone, the number of
patients on the waiting list has doubled over the past decade reaching around 100 000
patients, median waiting time has increased by 50% to over 4.5 years and nearly 5000
patients die whilst waiting for a deceased donor kidney transplant every year.3 Similar trends
have been noted in other countries (Figure 1 and Table 1).
While living donors usually donate to a specified recipient, in most countries deceased organ
donation is non-directed and organs are offered to patients on a waiting list via an allocation
scheme. Allocation schemes are generally governed by appointed transplant organisations
that may operate at a regional, national or even international level. Ownership of deceased
donor organs is a controversial matter; in some countries they are considered a national
resource, while in others they are retained within the donor region, and sharing between
regions may be limited to payback requirements. Thus allocation schemes vary from simple
local programmes to complex national algorithms. Furthermore, there is no universal
consensus on the factors that should be considered in the allocation process, leading to
considerable variation in the way patients are prioritised within different schemes.
The major debate in the allocation of scarce donor organs centres on the competing ethical
values of utility (maximum outcomes) and equity (fairness). Consideration must be given to
the efficient use of organs to optimise outcomes and the overall benefit to society, but also to
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the welfare of individual patients and fair access to transplantation.4 Utility-based allocation
prioritises patients with the best chance of a favourable outcome, aiming to achieve the
maximum benefit from every transplanted organ. Inevitably, this gives rise to debate over
how benefit should be measured – i.e. graft survival, patient survival, life years gained from
transplant or quality of life? Furthermore, it disadvantages patients less likely to experience a
good outcome, such as patients who are older, diabetic, have more comorbidity or have been
on dialysis for a longer period of time.5-9 An increasing proportion of patients on the waiting
list fall into these categories, yet still derive a significant survival benefit from
transplantation.1, 10-12 The principle of equity necessitates fairness in organ allocation,
however this may be interpreted in various ways. Equity is commonly conceived as “equal
opportunity” i.e. every person who may benefit from a transplant should have equal
opportunity of receiving one.13 It is important not to misinterpret this as equality; although
equality involves treating all patients exactly the same (i.e. allocation by lottery), it neglects
the fact that patients do not start from equal circumstances.14 The discovery of HLA-
matching as a major determinant of graft survival led to its principal role in the first formal
allocation schemes.15-17 However, it became apparent that such schemes resulted in
inequitable access to transplantation for difficult to match patients.18-20 Consequently, most
schemes now award extra priority to highly-sensitised patients and patients with rare HLA-
types (most commonly from ethnic minorities) who are biologically disadvantaged in finding
a compatible donor, in order to equalise their opportunity for transplantation. “Queuing”
(first-come, first-served) is another concept of equity that has been widely accepted in kidney
allocation. However, with the increasing age and morbidity of patients on the waiting list, this
approach has been challenged for favouring those who are able to survive the ever-increasing
wait. Furthermore, with growing evidence for disparities in access to the waiting list, many
schemes now measure waiting time from the start date of dialysis as opposed to the listing
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date, although some countries are yet to adopt this approach. Priority for paediatric patients is
universally acknowledged in view of the detrimental impact of renal failure and prolonged
dialysis on growth and development (although the age cut-off and level of priority varies
substantially between different schemes). In contrast, the prioritisation of younger adults over
older adults is widely disputed. While advocates of the “fair innings” concept believe equity
should be measured by the opportunity to reach a normal life expectancy, critics argue that
preferential allocation to younger patients is age discrimination.21 The “prudential lifespan”
provides an alternative concept of equity through the allocation of kidneys by age-matching.
This justifies the allocation of younger (and therefore “higher quality” kidneys) to younger
recipients and the allocation of older kidneys to older recipients since all patients are treated
similarly in a particular stage of life.22 However, this approach becomes problematic if there
is a discrepancy in the age distribution of donor and recipient pools. Moreover, age is just one
of many factors which influence the outcome of transplanted kidneys. A range of survival
predictors are utilised in the emerging concept of longevity-matching, where kidneys are
allocated based on matching of estimated graft and recipient survival. This approach remains
controversial, reflecting the enduring difficulties in achieving an acceptable balance between
utility and equity.
This review compares the allocation schemes of several different countries and explores their
evolution over the last decade.
United Kingdom
The first UK national kidney allocation scheme was a simple HLA-matching scheme
introduced in 1989. One kidney from each donor was allocated nationally to a “beneficially
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mismatched recipient” (defined as HLA-A, -B and -DR mismatch 000, 100 or 010), while the
paired donor kidney was allocated locally according to individual centre policies.17, 23
A revised scheme was implemented in 1998, after three distinct tiers of HLA-mismatch were
identified as major influences on graft outcome.24 Allocation was prioritised to tier 1 (000
mismatch) followed by tier 2 (100, 010, 110 mismatch) patients nationally, otherwise
allocation was on a local basis to tier 3 patients (all other HLA-mismatch grades). Within
tiers 1 and 2, priority was given to paediatric patients (<18 years), patients disadvantaged in
finding a compatible donor (highly-sensitised [panel reactive antibody, PRA ≥85%], HLA-
DR homozygous and blood group B) and local patients. A points score differentiated equally
eligible patients within the tiers, based on recipient age, donor-recipient age difference,
waiting time (from listing date), matchability score, level of sensitisation and balance of
organ exchange between centres. Matchability was a measure of the likelihood of being
offered a well-matched kidney (tier 1 or 2); the aim being to improve access for difficult to
match patients. However, because the points score was employed only to differentiate equally
HLA-matched patients, the overall effect of the point-scoring factors proved to be minimal.
Although the 1998 scheme improved the level of HLA-matching of allocated kidneys,
inequity of access remained a significant issue.24
In 2006 a new scheme was implemented and this remains in place to date, albeit with minor
modifications.25 Previously deemed non-favourable levels of HLA-mismatch were shown to
be achieving good outcomes, therefore the new scheme places less emphasis on HLA-
matching and except for zero HLA-matches, HLA-A matching is no longer taken into
account.8 Zero HLA-mismatched patients retain top priority along with well-matched (100,
010, 110) paediatric patients, HLA-DR homozygous patients and highly-sensitised patients
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(now measured as calculated reaction frequency, cRF, ≥85%). cRF is the percentage of 10
000 recent donors that the patient has pre-formed antibodies against. The points score was
also revised; where previously waiting time contributed the least points, it now has
potentially the greatest influence (although continues to be defined as time from listing).
Points for recipient age are combined with HLA-mismatch in a novel approach to prioritise
younger patients for well-matched grafts. This minimises HLA-sensitisation and improves
the likelihood of re-transplantation, which is particularly crucial for younger recipients who
are likely to require more than one graft in their lifetime. Other point-scoring factors include
the proximity of the donor to the recipient centre (to minimise ischaemia), donor-recipient
age difference, HLA-DR and –B homozygosity and blood group (to address imbalances of
distribution between donor and recipient pools). Since the matchability score proved to be
unsuccessful in improving equity, the 2006 scheme utilises a different approach whereby rare
HLA-types are defaulted to more common related HLA-types against which cross-reacting
antibodies seldom form. In September 2014, the national scheme was extended to include
allocation of donors after circulatory death (DCD). In the phase-in period this only applies to
one kidney from DCD donors aged 5 to 50 years.26
The 2006 scheme has successfully increased the number of transplants for highly-sensitised,
long waiting, difficult to match and Black, Asian and minority ethnic patients, without
compromising graft or patient survival (Table 2). Nevertheless, the past decade has also seen
an overall increase in the size of the waiting list, median waiting time (Table 1) and the
number of discarded kidneys.27 This raises concerns over the efficiency and suitability of the




The first US kidney allocation scheme was introduced in 1987, and a completely revised
scheme was implemented for the first time in 2014.28 Under the former system, the country
was divided into 58 donor service areas (DSAs), responsible for local procurement and
allocation of deceased donor organs.29 Although there was mandatory national sharing of
zero HLA-mismatched kidneys, these were required to be paid back to the procuring DSA.
The large majority of organs were retained within and allocated by individual DSAs. Given
that local organ supply relative to demand varied widely between DSAs, this led to
substantial disparities in waiting time across the country.30 In March 2000, the Department of
Health and Human Services issued “The Final Rule” in order to establish a national
framework for organ allocation and reduce geographical inequities.31 Following this, all
kidneys were allocated via one of four sequences according to the category of the donor:
• Standard criteria donors (SCD) < 35 years
• SCD ≥ 35 years
• Expanded criteria donors (ECD)
• Donors after circulatory death (DCD)
ECD kidneys were defined by an estimated risk of graft failure ≥70% higher than SCD
kidneys and were offered to specifically consented recipients.32 Within each sequence,
priority was given to zero HLA-mismatched patients, blood group identical patients, highly-
sensitised patients (cPRA ≥80%), paediatric patients (<18 years), prior live organ donors,
local patients and DSAs owed a payback. A points score was used to rank individual patients
(ECD/DCD recipients were ranked by waiting time only).33 The points score was extensively
modified over time towards fewer points for HLA-matching (except for zero HLA-
mismatches, HLA-A matching was eliminated in 1995 and HLA-B matching eliminated in
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2003) and more points for waiting time, reflecting efforts to achieve a more equitable
system.34, 35 The “Share 35” scheme was implemented in 2005, which awarded extra priority
to paediatric recipients for donors under 35 years and zero HLA-mismatched donors of all
ages, but was unexpectedly associated with a decline in paediatric living donor transplants.36,
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Despite repeated efforts to improve the former system, it was perceived as inefficient and
inequitable. Over the last decade, waiting list numbers doubled, death on the waiting list
increased (Table 1) and average post-transplant survival deteriorated.38 By 2011, 39 of the 58
DSAs were operating at least one variance to the national system, resulting in inconsistent
allocation across the country.39 Waiting time had become the dominant factor of allocation
due to efforts to improve equity, but this created a system that was essentially a queue, with
minimal regard for outcomes. As such, kidneys with a long predicted life-span were often
allocated to patients with significantly shorter life expectancy, leading to high rates of death
with a functioning graft and unrealised graft benefit. Similarly, younger patients were
frequently allocated kidneys with a much shorter life span, resulting in high discard rates, re-
transplantation rates and HLA-sensitisation.40
The key concept of the new system is longevity matching, whereby the 20% of listed patients
with the longest estimated post-transplant survival are prioritised for the 20% of kidneys with
the longest estimated graft survival.28 The Estimated Post-Transplant Survival score (EPTS)
predicts patient survival based on age, time on dialysis, diabetes status and prior
transplantation. Graft survival is estimated by the Kidney Donor Profile Index (KDPI); a
continuous measure based on 10 donor characteristics (Table 3). This replaces the previous
dichotomous ECD/SCD stratification of donor kidneys which inadequately reflected the risk
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of graft failure.41 As before, kidneys are allocated through 4 sequences, now defined by the
KDPI score of the donor kidney (KDPI ≤20%, 20% > KDPI < 35%, 35% ≥ KDPI ≤85%,
KDPI >85%). Paediatric patients retain priority for zero HLA-mismatched kidneys and for
KDPI <35% kidneys. Local priority is also retained, but paybacks and local variances no
longer permitted. Changes to the points system include calculating waiting time from the start
of dialysis instead of listing and using a sliding scale of points for sensitisation level.
It is expected that the new scheme will enhance utility by an additional 9000 life years
annually and improve transplantation rates for highly-sensitised, ethnic minority and patients
18-49 years. However it is acknowledged that the scheme will likely decrease access to
transplantation for patients >50 years.39
Australia
Previously low donation and transplantation rates in Australia have increased significantly
since implementation of the national Organ and Tissue Authority in 2008.2, 42 Remarkably,
Australia is now one of few countries where waiting list numbers and median waiting time
have reduced over the past decade (Table 1). The decline may be linked to the introduction of
national listing criteria that restrict access to the kidney transplant waiting list to patients with
an estimated 5-year post-transplant survival of over 80%.43 These criteria are relatively strict
compared with current European guidelines that recommend exclusion of patients with a life
expectancy of less than 2 years.44
The national allocation system was introduced in 2008. Only well-matched grafts are
allocated nationally (maximum 2 HLA-mismatches at HLA-A, -B, or -DR if PRA>80% and
11
at HLA-A or -B only if PRA<80%). Around 20% of kidneys achieve this level of matching
whilst the remaining 80% are allocated locally via state-based algorithms. The national
algorithm is based on a points system starting with a base score from which points are
deducted or gained. Priority is given to zero HLA-mismatches, sensitised patients at 2 levels
(PRA >50% and >80%), paediatric patients (<18 years), waiting time (from start of dialysis)
and local patients. Balance of exchange is also taken into account. Although state-based
algorithms differ, all are required to allocate a minimum of 30% of kidneys on waiting time
alone, in order to improve equity for difficult to match patients.43
New Zealand
New Zealand’s organ donation and transplantation rates have remained inferior to those of
other western countries (Table 1). New Zealand has a mainly white donor population,
compared to an ESRD population consisting of a high proportion of Maori and Pacific Island
Nation people, leading to inequity issues for difficult to match patients similar to the UK, US
and Australia.45
Access to the waiting list is determined by the same listing criteria used by Australia
(estimated 5-year post-transplant survival of >80%) but in contrast estimates are calculated
from a survival prediction tool, based on an index derived and validated in a US dataset of
170 000 patients.46 Patients are rescored annually or at the time of any change in their health
status, and removed from the waiting list if their score falls below 70%.47
The structure of the allocation protocol is also similar to the Australian system, whereby
patients start with a baseline score from which points are deducted for HLA-mismatches and
gained for paediatric status (age <15 years) and waiting time (from start of dialysis).48 Unlike
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most other allocation systems, points are not awarded for HLA-sensitisation, as waiting time
is considered a good enough surrogate for this. There are 2 levels of allocation; level 1 aims
to allocate to well-matched patients (maximum of 2 HLA-A or -B mismatches) and level 2 to
longer waiting patients.49 The structure of the protocol has remained largely unchanged over
the past decade with minor modifications implemented on the basis of audit data; HLA-DR
mismatches were excluded from level 1 in 2013 to reduce the percentage of kidneys allocated
in this level, age-matching was abolished as the majority of kidneys were from older donors
and it became apparent that younger patients were being disadvantaged and waiting time was
given increased weighting in the points score (personal communication, Ian Dittmer,
26/12/2014). A novel feature of the New Zealand kidney allocation scheme is that all ECD
kidneys are biopsied, reviewed by an on-call pathologist and scored according to the Remuzzi
classification. Kidneys scoring 4-6 are offered as dual transplants and those scoring ≥7 are
discarded.49
Eurotransplant
Eurotransplant was created in 1967 as an international collaboration between Austria,
Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and was later joined by Slovenia in
1999, Croatia in 2007 and Hungary in 2013. The vision was to pool together the donor organs
and create a centralised waiting list in order to optimise HLA-matching and improve
transplant outcomes. However, the early HLA-based kidney allocation system led to a high
percentage of highly-sensitised, long waiting, rare HLA-phenotype and HLA-homozygous
patients on the waiting list, as well as large imbalances of exchange between countries.50
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In 1996 the new Eurotransplant Kidney Allocation System (ETKAS) was introduced in order
to address these issues.51 This was a points-scoring system based on HLA-mismatch,
mismatch probability, waiting time, distance between donor and transplant centre, national
balance of exchange, medical urgency and paediatric age. ETKAS remains in place to date.52
Points are awarded according to the number of HLA-mismatches (0-6), and uniquely equal
weighting is given to HLA-A, -B and –DR loci. Mismatch probability is a measure of the
likelihood of finding a 0 or 1 HLA-mismatched donor, based on the frequencies of HLA-
antigens in the Eurotransplant donor pool. Waiting time was counted from date of registration
until April 2000, and thereafter from date of first dialysis.50 Paediatric status was previously
defined as aged <16 years, but since 2010 those >16 years with growth potential proven by an
X-ray of the hand are granted paediatric status. Paediatric patients are assigned additional
waiting points according to the age of listing, are given double points for zero HLA-
mismatched donors and since 2010 are given priority for donors < 16 years.53 Since 2013,
previous kidney donors are given a one off bonus of 500 extra points upon registration to the
waiting list. A distinctive feature of ETKAS is the inclusion of medical urgency in the
allocation score. ETKAS has been successful in transplanting a higher percentage of long
waiting, highly-sensitised, rare HLA-phenotype and paediatric patients, and equalising the
international imbalances in organ exchange.54, 55
Eurotransplant was the first organisation to develop special allocation programs for specific
groups of patients (Figure 2). The Acceptable Mismatch Program (AMP) was introduced in
1996 for highly-sensitised patients (PRA >85%), where it is determined which HLA-antigens
the patient does not have antibodies against, and priority is given for any donor with
acceptable antigens.56, 57 The Eurotransplant Senior Program (ESP) started in 1999, in which
non-sensitised recipients aged >65 years are prioritised for donors >65 years irrespective of
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HLA-matching. Allocation is based on medical urgency and waiting time only, and
preferentially on a local basis to minimise cold ischaemia time.58, 59 These programs have
been successful in increasing the number of transplants and shortening the waiting time for
these groups of patients.60-63
Scandiatransplant
Scandiatransplant was formed in 1969 as a collaboration between the Nordic countries
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). Kidneys were originally exchanged
exclusively on the basis of HLA-matching, but current criteria include priority for highly-
sensitised and paediatric patients.64 Unlike most schemes, it does not employ the use of a
points system. There is mandatory exchange of at least one donor kidney when a patient on
the waiting list has zero HLA-mismatches, defined acceptable mismatches as part of the
Scandiatransplant acceptable mismatch program (STAMP) (see below) or is a paediatric
patient (<16 years at registration) with a maximum of 2 HLA-A or -B mismatches for a donor
<40 years. Priority is given to highly-sensitised patients (PRA ≥ 80%), followed by those
with acceptable mismatches, followed by sensitised patients (PRA 10-80%). Only blood
group identical exchanges are allowed and donor-recipient age differences of over 30 years
are not permitted. There is strict control of balance of exchange and kidneys are required to
be paid back within 6 months. For all other kidneys that do not meet the mandatory exchange
criteria, allocation is via local transplant centre policies.65
The STAMP program was introduced in 2009. Patients may be accepted onto the program
with a PRA≥ 80% and minimum waiting time of 1 year (not necessary for paediatric
patients). Within the first 3 years of the program, the number of transplanted highly-
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sensitised patients increased significantly and the mean waiting time for these patients
dropped from 42 to 37 months.66
Israel
The Israeli parliament passed the Organ Transplantation Law in 2008 in order to tackle 3
major barriers to organ donation in Israel.67 Firstly, it banned the previously legal insurance
funding for overseas transplants and declared organ trafficking a criminal offence. Secondly,
it clearly defined brain death in a way that was acceptable to both the medical and religious
communities. Thirdly, it launched a major campaign to promote organ donation based on
reciprocal altruism, by granting allocation priority to registered organ donors (≥3 years prior
to listing), previous living donors and first-degree relatives of deceased donors. The measures
have significantly reduced transplant tourism and increased both living and deceased
donation and transplantation rates.68-70
The allocation system in Israel is a simple point scoring system. Points are awarded for
waiting time (from date of first dialysis), age, HLA-mismatch, and level of sensitisation. Age
points include priority for paediatric patients but also for younger adults over older adults.
There is age-matching of donors and recipients <18 and >60 years. Points for sensitisation are
awarded incrementally for each 25% increase in PRA, therefore providing some priority for
patients who are moderately sensitised.71
Spain
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Spain is renowned as a world leader in organ donation.72, 73 Although Spain’s “opt-out”
system legally allows presumed consent for organ donation, consent from relatives is always
sought. The success of the Spanish Model is instead attributed for the most part to a network
of highly trained donor coordinators.74 Since the program was introduced in 1989 donation
rates have dramatically increased from 14 to 36 donors per million population (pmp), which
is almost double the average European country.72 Remarkably, donation rates are equal
amongst native as well as immigrant populations.2
The high donation rate in Spain allows for most allocation to occur on a local basis. Criteria
vary by region, but include waiting time, HLA-matching, ABO blood group, age, height,
weight and primary renal diagnosis.74, 75 If a recipient cannot be found on local waiting lists,
kidneys are offered regionally and then nationally. There is also a national exchange system
for highly-sensitised recipients (PRA >80%) and an “old for old” program based solely on
age-matching.76
France
The French national kidney allocation system was first introduced in 1996. Kidneys are
allocated on three priority levels: local, regional and national. National priority was given to
all zero HLA-mismatched recipients until 2004, and thereafter restricted to recipients with
PRA>5%.77 Highly-sensitised patients (PRA>80%) are prioritised nationally for kidneys with
a maximum of 1 HLA-mismatch, and since 2004 this also includes kidneys with “acceptable
mismatches”.77 All paediatric recipients are prioritised on a national level for paediatric
donors (paediatric definition increased from <16 to <18 years in 2004) and on a regional level
for donors <30 years.77 An expert kidney advisory panel can designate national priority for
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emergency situations such as loss of dialysis access. If a retrieved organ does not trigger any
national or regional priorities, it is allocated locally via a points scoring system introduced in
2006. This includes recipient age, waiting time, HLA-mismatch and donor-recipient age
difference.78
Discussion
Given the tremendous impact of kidney allocation policy at both an individual as well as a
societal level, allocation schemes should be continually reviewed and adapted in line with the
evolving medical, ethical and social landscape of kidney transplantation. This paper
examined the allocation schemes of several countries in which deceased donor kidney
transplantation is an accepted and well-established practice. In these jurisdictions, the
creation of national transplant organisations has been fundamental to the standardisation and
regulation of the organ offering process. Local centre-based allocation decisions that were
largely led by HLA-matching and clinician choice have been mostly superseded by national
(and sometimes international) protocols that are publicly available, enabling their evaluation.
Despite differences in their specific criteria, all of these allocation policies strive for the same
core principles of transparency, accountability and equity of access to kidney transplantation.
The importance of this ethical framework for organ allocation is set out in guiding principles
by the World Health Organisation and in The Declaration of Istanbul.79, 80 Allocation
schemes that are designed around the preferences of all relevant stakeholders and supported
by legislation are fundamental to the effective governance of organ donation and
transplantation programs. It is evident that in the absence of such oversight, vulnerable
populations are at risk of injustice and exploitation through unethical practices such as organ
trafficking, transplant commercialism and transplant tourism.
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A further step forwards in improving the objectivity of allocation has been the introduction of
point-scoring systems, which can be adjusted according to changing scientific evidence,
clinical practice or public expectations. Simulation plays an important role in estimating the
impact of proposed changes to allocation systems. Specific outcome measures such as life
years gained from transplant or the proportion of kidneys allocated to specific patient groups
can be simulated with historical data to produce optimal score weights. Although limited by
unpredictable human behaviour (i.e. organ acceptance decisions), simulation is becoming a
valuable evidence-based tool in allocation system development.
In more ethnically diverse populations, organ sharing based largely on HLA-matching has led
to marked inequity of access for ethnic minorities, necessitating more complex algorithms to
address this. These inequity issues, combined with evidence for a diminishing effect of HLA-
matching on graft survival in the era of improved immunosuppressive therapy,81 have
prompted revisions to reduce its weighting in most, but not all policies. While some countries
have eliminated allocation priority for HLA-A and/or -B matching, this has not been widely
implemented, and indeed equal weighting for matching at each of the three HLA-loci is
preserved in some allocation systems (Table 4). Poorly HLA-matched grafts are more likely
to result in HLA-sensitisation and in the event of graft failure this jeopardises the chances of
HLA-compatible re-transplantation. The level of HLA-matching and in particular HLA-DR
matching are of particular importance for younger patients who are likely to require more
than one graft over the course of their lifetime. Increased mismatches at first transplant are
associated with a higher degree of sensitisation, longer waiting time, reduced likelihood of re-
transplantation and decreased re-graft survival.82 Many schemes have addressed this by
prioritising younger patients for well-matched grafts. For patients who are highly-sensitised,
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the targeted approach of “Acceptable Mismatch Programs” adopted by many countries, have
proved successful in improving access to transplantation for these patients. Waiting time has
become the dominant factor of allocation in many schemes as concerns over inequity have
risen. In the US, this was illustrated by a complete reversal of weighting in allocation; where
previously waiting time served mostly as a tie-breaker between two similarly HLA-matched
recipients, HLA-match became the deciding factor between patients with similar waiting
times.83
The severe shortage of donors, as well as an ageing and more infirm population, has led to
increasing use of more “marginal” organs. Despite reduced graft survival, they can offer
certain patients improved life expectancy when compared with staying on dialysis.32, 84, 85
However, in order to optimise any benefit gained, careful donor and recipient selection and
matching is required. Remarkably, in some countries there are no distinct schemes for
allocating marginal grafts. While Eurotransplant and Spain have instituted specific “Old for
Old” programs, the UK and France have incorporated donor-recipient age matching into their
allocation systems. Nevertheless, these approaches have been criticised for using
chronological age as a surrogate of graft function and recipient survival, when many other
important factors have been described. The previous US ECD scheme was a step forwards in
classifying the quality of donor organs based on several validated donor risk factors, in
addition to age. However, the scheme was criticised for the dichotomous stratification of
donor kidneys as ECD or non-ECD, when in reality the risk of graft failure is better
characterised by a continuous scale.41 The new US system reflects this with the KDPI.86 This
continuous measure of predicted graft survival is used to allocate kidneys based on a
recipient’s estimated post-transplant survival. Although this applies only to the 20% of
recipients with the longest estimated survival, this degree of survival matching is a first in
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kidney allocation. In New Zealand, a similar prognostic index of post-transplant survival
based on multiple patient risk factors is utilised in a novel way to provide an objective
criterion (5-year survival >80%) for access to the waiting list. This evidence-based risk
stratification ensures those listed have a reasonable expectation of receiving and surviving a
transplant. A nationally applicable survival probability threshold for listing, is perhaps the
most equitable way of determining access to the waiting list, whilst also ensuring optimal use
of a scarce resource.
The transplant community should be proud of the significant progress that has been achieved
in improving the transparency, accountability and equity of kidney allocation. However, in
the context of the continuing shortage of donor organs, further work is needed to reduce the
discard of donated kidneys and to optimise the efficiency of allocation.
Conclusion
Despite striking shifts in the demographics of donor and recipient populations, there has been
relatively little change in deceased donor kidney allocation over the past decade. Given that
the donor shortage shows no signs of abatement, it may be timely to consider a radical
change in the ideology governing kidney allocation towards “the right kidney to the right
recipient”. Sophisticated donor-recipient survival matching may well be the optimal
compromise between utility and equity that the transplant community strives for.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1. Patients on Kidney Transplant Waiting List 2003 vs 2013
Eurotransplant 2003 = Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Slovenia.
Eurotransplant 2013 = Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and
Slovenia
Scandiatransplant = Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
Data sources: UK,87-89 US,3, 90, 91 Australia,92, 93 New Zealand,92, 93 Eurotransplant,94, 95 Scandiatransplant,96, 97


























































UK US Australia New Zealand Eurotransplant a Scandiatransplant b Israel Spain France
Year 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013
Population (million) c 59.5 64.0 291.0 317.1 19.7 23.3 4.0 4.5 118.8 133.8 24.4 26.1 6.4 7.8 42.5 46.5 60.5 63.8
Total kidney
transplants
n 1836 3256 15138 16895 543 882 111 115 3991 4586 926 1103 126 264 2051 2552 2127 3074
pmp 30.9 50.9 52 53.3 27.6 37.9 27.8 25.6 33.6 34.3 38 42.3 19.7 33.8 48.3 54.9 35.2 48.2
DD transplants
n 1386 2142 8668 11163 325 630 67 57 3345 3183 654 756 55 128 1991 2170 1991 2673
pmp 23.3 33.5 29.8 35.2 16.5 27 16.8 12.7 28.1 23.8 26.8 29 8.6 16.4 46.8 46.7 32.9 41.9
LD transplants
n 450 1114 6470 5732 218 252 44 58 646 1403 272 347 71 136 60 382 136 401
pmp 7.6 17.4 22.2 18.1 11.2 10.8 11 12.9 5.4 10.5 11.1 13.3 11.1 17.4 1.4 8.2 2.2 6.3
Patients on waiting list
at year end
n 5074 5881 d 56514 99253 1591 1056 318 438 12382 11120 1231 1333 469 762 4026 4328 5380 10736
pmp 85.3 91.9 194.2 313 80.8 45.3 79.5 97.3 104.2 83.1 50.5 51.1 73.3 97.7 94.7 93.1 88.9 168.3
Died on waiting list
n 298 279 3895 4644 45 3 x x 646 593 20 74 16 30 x x 113 252
pmp 5 4.4 13.4 14.6 2.3 0.1 x x 5.4 4.4 0.8 2.8 2.5 3.8 x x 1.9 3.9
Median waiting time
years 2.3 2.7 3.2 4.5 3.7 2.7 x x 3.3 3.7 1.1 1.2 x x x x 1.4 2.4
Table 1. Kidney Transplant and Waiting List Figures 2003 vs 2013
(PMP; per million population, DD; Deceased donor, LD; Living donor)
x Data not available
a Eurotransplant 2003 = Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Slovenia. Eurotransplant 2013 = Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and Slovenia
b Scandiatransplant = Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden
c Data from United Nations Population Division
d Note this number represents a downward trend since 2009
Data sources: UK,87-89 US,3, 90, 91 Australia,92, 93 New Zealand,92, 93 Eurotransplant,94, 95 Scandiatransplant,96, 97 Israel,98, 99 Spain,98, 99 France 98-100
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Actual DBD Kidney only transplants in the UK
1 Jan 03 - 31 Dec 03 1 Jan 13 - 31 Dec 13
n % n %
Number of transplants 1133 1161
HLA-mismatches
Level 1 (000 MM) 193 17.0 216 18.6
Level 2 (0DR+0/1B MM) 588 51.9 437 37.6
Level 3 (0DR+2B or 1DR+0/1B MM) 270 23.8 477 41.1
Level 4 (2B+1DR or 2DR MM) 82 7.2 31 2.7
Matchability
Easy (1-3) 538 47.5 441 38.0
Moderate (4-7) 429 37.9 512 44.1
Difficult (8-10) 165 14.6 207 17.8
Highly-sensitised (cRF>85%) 53 4.7 195 16.8
Waiting time
<1 yr 497 43.9 236 20.3
1-3 yrs 392 34.6 370 31.9
3-5 yrs 143 12.6 326 28.1
5-7 yrs 48 4.2 159 13.7
>=7 yrs 53 4.7 70 6.0
Recipient age
0-5 10 0.9 7 0.6
6-11 21 1.9 17 1.5
12-17 52 4.6 34 2.9
18-29 122 10.8 107 9.2
30-39 200 17.7 171 14.7
40-49 273 24.1 278 23.9
50-59 266 23.5 269 23.2
60-69 163 14.4 209 18
>=70 26 2.3 69 5.9
Donor-recipient age difference
<15 yrs 688 60.7 732 63.0
15-25 yrs 260 22.9 299 25.8
>25 yrs 185 16.3 130 11.2
Recipient blood group
O 467 41.2 512 44.1
A 460 40.6 423 36.4
B 150 13.2 166 14.3
AB 56 4.9 60 5.2
Homozygosity
HLA-A 161 14.2 148 12.7
HLA-B 90 7.9 84 7.2
HLA-DR 103 9.1 146 12.6
HLA-A,B,DR 16 1.4 29 2.5
Graft number
1 954 84.2 939 80.9
2 149 13.2 186 16.0
3 24 2.1 31 2.7
4 6 0.5 5 0.4
Diabetic 74 6.5 75 6.5
Gender (Male) 697 61.5 717 61.8
Ethnicity
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White 981 86.6 824 71.0
Asian 96 8.5 205 17.7
Black 43 3.8 95 8.2
Other 11 1.0 31 2.7
Not Reported 2 0.2 6 0.5
Exchange
Local centre 402 35.5 189 16.3
Local area 399 35.2 604 52.0
Other 332 29.3 368 31.7
Median CIT 18.5 hrs (IQR 15.9 - 22.4) 14.5 hrs (IQR 11.4 - 17.9)
1-year Graft Survival 91.2% (95% CI 89.3 – 92.7) 94.1% (95% CI 92.4 – 95.4)
1-year Patient Survival 95.5% (95% CI 93.9 – 96.7) 95.9% (95% CI 94.2 – 97.1)
Table 2. Transplant characteristics for DBD kidney only transplants in the UK 2003 vs 2013.
(DBD; Donor after Brain Death, HLA; Human Leukocyte Antigen, MM; Mismatch, cRF; Calculated Reaction Frequency, CIT;
Cold Ischaemia Time)
Data source: NHSBT Data Request. Based on data as of January 20, 2015.
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Figure 2. Eurotransplant kidney allocation flow chart
(ESP; Eurotransplant Senior Program, AM; Acceptable Mismatch, ETKAS; Eurotransplant Kidney Allocation
System)











Hepatitis C Virus status
Donation after circulatory death status
Table 3. Factors used to calculate the Kidney Donor Risk Index (KDRI)
Source: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network Policy 8.28
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UK US Australia New Zealand
2003 2013 2003 2013 2014 2003 2013 2003 2013
HLA-mismatch
DR + + + + + + + + +
B + + + - - + + + +
A + - - - - + + + +
HLA loci importance DR > B / A DR > B DR > B DR only DR only DR > B / A DR > B / A DR > B > A DR > B > A
Waiting time + + + + + + + + +
Waiting time definition Listing date Listing date Listing date Listing date Start of dialysis Start of dialysis Start of dialysis Latest of start
of dialysis or
listing date
Latest of start of
dialysis or listing
date
Priority for paediatric recipients + + + + + + + + +





<15 years <15 years
Recipient age + + b - - + - - - -
Donor-recipient age matching + + - - - - - + -
Priority for highly-sensitised
recipients
+ + + + + + + - -
Applicable level of PRA/cPRA (%) 85 85 80 80 20-100 c 50 50/80 d N/A N/A
Priority for HLA homozygous
recipients
DR DR, B - - - - - - -
Local allocation priority + + + + + + + - -
Balance of exchange + - + + - + + - -
Point scoring systems in use + + + + + + + + +
Special program for allocation of
marginal donors
- - + + + - - - -































Table 4. Criteria for deceased donor kidney allocation 2003 vs 2013.
(HLA; Human Leukocyte Antigen, MM; Mismatch, PRA; Panel Reactive Antibody, cPRA; Calculated Panel Reactive Antibody, EPTS; Estimated Post-Transplant Survival Score, KDPI; Kidney
Donor Profile Index, AMP; Acceptable Mismatch Program, ESP; Eurotransplant Senior Program, STAMP; Scandiatransplant Acceptable Mismatch Program, PRD; Primary Renal Diagnosis)
a No national allocation system. Criteria applicable only at local level
b Age & HLA-MM combined
c Sliding scale of points
d >50% for 000 MM, >80% for all other MM levels
Eurotransplant Scandiatransplant Israel Spain a France
2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013 2003 2013
HLA-mismatch
DR + + + + + + + +
B + + + + + + + +
A + + + + + + + +
HLA loci importance DR = B = A DR = B = A DR > B / A DR > B / A DR > B / A DR > B / A ? ? DR = A = B DR > A / B
Waiting time + + - - + + + + + +
Waiting time definition Start of dialysis Start of dialysis N/A N/A Start of dialysis Start of dialysis ? ? ? ?
Priority for paediatric recipients + + + + + + + + + +
Definition of paediatric recipient <16 years <16 years or >16
years and growth
potential proven





<18 years <18 years ? ? <16 years <18 years
Recipient age - - - - + + + + - +
Donor-recipient age matching - - + + + + + + - +
Priority for highly-sensitised
recipients
+ + + + + + + + + +
Applicable level of PRA/cPRA (%) 85 85 80 80 26-100 c 26-100 c 80 80 80 85
Priority for HLA homozygous
recipients
+ + - - - - - - - -
Local allocation priority + + - - - - + + - +
Balance of exchange + + + + - - - - - -
Point scoring systems in use + + - - + + - - - +
Special program for allocation of
marginal donors
+ + - - - - - - - -











donors of at least











Search strategy and selection criteria
References for this review were identified by searches of PubMed and Google Scholar using
the terms “kidney”, “deceased donor kidney”, “cadaver kidney” or “kidney transplant”
combined with “allocation”, “offering scheme”, “distribution” or “selection criteria” for
publications in any language before 30/04/2016. Data were also obtained by direct contact
with national transplant registries, their websites and reports; including UK Transplant
(http://www.odt.nhs.uk/uk-transplant-registry/), US United Network for Organ Sharing
(https://www.unos.org/), Australia and New Zealand Dialysis and Transplant Registry
(http://www.anzdata.org.au/v1/), Eurotransplant (https://www.eurotransplant.org/cms/),
Scandiatransplant (http://www.scandiatransplant.org/), Israel (https://www.adi.gov.il/), Spain
Organizacion nacional de trasplantes (http://www.ont.es/) and France agence de la
biomedicine (http://www.agence-biomedecine.fr/).
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